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This paper explores the evolution of OECD imports 
over time, measuring their concentration across origin 
countries at the product level. The authors find evidence 
of diversification followed, in the very last years of the 
sample period (post-2000), by a slight re-concentration. 
This re-concentration is entirely explained by the 
growing importance of Chinese products in OECD 
imports. They also find evidence of relatively more 
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volatile concentration levels for goods with high quality 
heterogeneity, with temporary phases of re-concentration 
on goods with higher unit values. Both findings are 
consistent with a simple model of adverse selection 
and quality screening by OECD buyers predicting 
that diversification happens by “bouts” rather than 
continuously, with temporary re-concentration on 
higher-quality suppliers. 
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1. Introduction 
In spite of the rapid growth of emerging markets, OECD markets are still, today, the 
world‘s largest, providing key outlets for goods exported from developing countries. 
How much access there is for developing countries on OECD markets has been the 
subject  of  considerable  attention  from  a  policy  angle  (see  e.g.  Kee,  Nicita  and 
Olarreaga 2009 and references therein). By contrast, to our knowledge, not much has 
been  written  on  the  outcome—the  overall  evolution  and  composition  of  OECD 
imports. Yet, it matters whether they are opening up in the sense of letting more 
extra-OECD  exporters  in,  or  concentrating  on  a  few  ―preferred‖  suppliers. 
Contestable OECD markets would make it easier for entrants to get a foothold; on the 
contrary, if they exhibited strong incumbency advantages, they could create a two-
track  world  among  extra-OECD  exporters  (between  countries  that  make  it  and 
countries that don‘t).  
 
So far, a rapidly expanding literature has looked at the other side of the story, namely 
how export diversification (geographical and product-wise) interacts with economic 
development.  Most  of  the  literature  has  looked  at  product-wise  diversification. 
Klinger and Lederman (2004) studied the rate at which new products (defined at the 
HS4 or HS6 level) appear in a country‘s export portfolio, and found that it varies with 
economic development and peaks at middle income levels. Hummels and Klenow 
(2005) introduced a decomposition of cross-country export variation into intensive 
and extensive margins that takes account of the economic significance of the goods.1 
They showed that about 60% of the larger export volumes of the larger economies to 
typical markets is explained by the extensive margin. Cad ot, Carrère and Strauss-
Kahn (2007) showed that product diversification (measured by Herfindahl, Theil and 
Gini indices) evolves with income levels in a non-monotone way, with diversification 
                                                   
1 Hummels and Klenow (2005, henceforth HK) define the intensive margin as the share of country i‘s 
exports value of good k in the world‘s exports of that good. That is, country i‘s intensive margin is its 
market share in what it exports. The extensive margin is defined as the share, in world exports, of 
those goods that country i exports (irrespective of how much i itself exports of those goods). That is, it 
indicates how much the goods which i exports count in world trade. By HK‘s definition, a country that 
exports cars and computers will have a larger extensive margin than a country that exports carrots and 
potatoes, although both export just two goods.   3 
followed by re-concentration beyond income levels around $20‘000 at PPP, a pattern 
similar to what Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) found for production. Hausmann, Hwang 
and Rodrik (2005) found that export diversification (instrumented) correlates with 
future income levels, and, moreover, that the similarity of a country‘s export portfolio 
with that of the U.S. reinforces the effect on income.  
 
A second, smaller strand of the literature has looked at the extensive margin defined 
geographically instead of product-wise. The first paper in that vein was Evenett and 
Venables (2002), who showed, on the basis of evidence for a limited set of developing 
countries, that about one third of the export growth observed during their sample 
period came from the expansion of existing exports to new markets. They found that 
the  product-wise  extensive  margin  accounted  for  only  a  small  fraction  of  within-
country export growth.2 On the basis of a larger sample, Brenton and Newfarmer 
(2007) found that the extensive margin accounted for only 19.6% of export growth; of 
that, 92% came from the export of existing products to new markets. 
 
Another, time-honored strand of the trade literature, going back to the work of 
Hanson (1996), has emphasized the formation of regional production networks by 
multinational  firms.  According  to  this  literature,  a  countr y‘s  exports  may  be 
determined by the outsourcing decisions of multinationals based in other countries. 
Anecdotal  evidence  also  suggests  that  it  is  retailers  who  decide  which  foreign 
suppliers (and hence countries) are included in cross-border supply chains. Thus, for 
producers located in developing countries, export opportunities are, at least partly, 
driven by the policies of large buyers in OECD countries. If those buyers decide to 
concentrate on a few suppliers in order, say, to simplify logistics or quality-control 
processes, opportunities will be fewer for entrants at every level of productivity and 
trade costs. Put differently, given the continued importance of OECD markets for 
developing-country exports, it seems difficult to understand how developing-country 
exports evolve without looking at how OECD imports evolve. This is what we set out 
to do in this paper. 
 
                                                   
2  As shown by Hummels and Klenow once the extensive margin is corrected for the importance of the 
new exports introduced, this result (the relative unimportance of the extensive margin) is reversed   4 
Using a very large database of OECD imports at the SITC4 level since 1963, we find 
that,  up  to  the  turn  of  the  century,  OECD  markets  have  been  diversifying  their 
sources  of  supplies  (geographically)  at  the  product  level.  This  is  reflected  in 
decreasing concentration indices and a rising number of export sources. However, 
the trend in concentration has reversed itself in recent years. We show that this trend 
reversal  is  entirely  explained  by  the  rising  share  of  Chinese  products  in  OECD 
imports, as concentration indices keep on decreasing monotonically when China is 
excluded. We also find that the pattern of import diversification at the product level is 
broadly consistent with a simple model where buyers screen suppliers for quality and 
toss  them  out  when  they  under-perform.  The  model  predicts  that  diversification 
happens by ―bouts‖, or temporary episodes, during which OECD buyers search for 
high-quality  suppliers.  Each  diversification  episode  is  followed  by  a  phase  of  re-
concentration on the best performers, until those fail (which happens stochastically), 
triggering new search phases. The model is a very simple, finite-horizon version of a 
classic two-arm bandit problem. It is close in spirit to Jaud (2011) who also uses a 
multi-arm  bandit  setup  to  explore  the  effect  of  tightening  standards  on  purchase 
volumes.  
 
We test the model‘s basic prediction by looking at the evolution of unit values during 
re-concentration episodes and at how the volatility of concentration indices varies 
across  products  types,  taking  the  variation  in  unit  values  as  a  proxy  for  quality 
heterogeneity. We find, as  predicted  by the model, that re-concentration, when it 
happens, is associated with a rise in unit values. That is, when buyers re-concentrate, 
they do so on higher-priced (and hence presumably higher-quality) suppliers rather 
than on the most price-competitive. We also find that concentration indices are more 
volatile, over time, for products whose quality (as proxied by unit values) is more 
heterogeneous across suppliers. 
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  analyses  the  overall  trend  in  OECD 
import concentration. Section 3 and 4 set up a simple model of supplier screening in 
the  presence  of  adverse  selection.  Section  5  explores  empirically  the  model‘s 
implications for patterns of concentration and diversification.  
   5 
2.   Measuring geographical import concentration 
2.1   Indices and data 
We measure, product by product, the geographical concentration of imports across 
origin  countries.  Our  measures  are  standard  ones:  Herfindahl  and  Theil.3  The 
Herfindahl index for good k, normalized to range between zero and one, is  















                   (1) 
where  /
ii
kt kt kt s x x   is the share of origin country i in OECD imports of product k at 
time t and  k n is the total number of countries with the capability to export good k. Our 
baseline definition of the set of potential exporters,  k n , which is time-invariant, is the 
simplest one: it is the set of all countries having exported good k to some destination 
in the world (not necessarily OECD countries) at least two years in a row over the 
sample  period.  We  impose  the  requirement  of  two  consecutive  years  of  exports 
instead of just one in order to ensure that the exporter is a successful one (Besedes 
and Prusa 2006a, 2006b show that two years is the median duration of export spells; 
only one year might signal failure rather than the capacity to export). This definition 
has the advantage of being time- and importer-invariant (the latter matters for the 
part of our analysis where we disaggregate OECD imports by importing country). 
 
Theil‘s entropy index (Theil 1972) is given by  
 
                                                   
3 We decided not to use Gini coefficient because of the issues associated with this concentration index. 
The Gini coefficient is a numerical representation of the degree of concentration and represents the 
distance between the Lorentz curve and the 45◦ line (egalitarian distribution). There are two issues 
with Gini coefficients. First, they place more weight on changes in the middle part of the distribution. 
If a transfer occurs from a larger number of exporters to a smaller number of exporters, it has a greater 
effect on the Gini if these numbers of exporters are near the middle rather than at the extremes of the 
distribution. Second, if the Lorentz curves cross, it is impossible to summarize the distribution in a 
single statistic without introducing value judgements. While studying concentration of import across 
time these issue should be relevant. Herfindahl and Theil indices are robust to these sensitivity issues 
[on this, see Sen (1997)]. 
















              (2) 
 
In  order  to  explore  action  at  the  extensive  margin,  we  also  consider  the  simple 
number of exporters of good k to OECD countries.  
 
Our data are COMTRADE import data for OECD countries (either taken as a bloc or 
disaggregated by importer) at the product level. Our preferred product classifications 
are SITC4. The alternative, HS6, is more disaggregated (with 4,990 to 5,016 lines 
depending on the year against 1,158 to 1,300 for SITC4), but the sample period is 
longer  with  SITC4,  which  also  underwent  fewer  revisions.  In  terms  of  country 
coverage, SITC4 data covers 210 countries between 1962 and 2006 (44 years); HS6 
coverage is nominally available starting 1988, but with only 12 countries (9 of which 
are OECD members) expanding gradually to 116 countries in 1995 and 140 in 2006. 
Descriptive statistics for our sample are shown for our indices in Table 1. 
 
  Table 1   
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
54030 144 53 12 253
All exporters
54030 57 35 1 223
Herfindahl 54030 0.19 0.13 0.03 1
Theil 54030 2.68 0.48 0.86 4.87
Extra-OECD exports only
53769 35 31 1 194
Herfindahl 53769 0.35 0.22 0.03 1







Note: All variables are defined at the product (SITC4) level. The number of observations should be 
interpreted as follows: The number of potential exporters of good k, nk, is observed for each of 1‘034 
products and each year, even though its value is, by construction, constant across years. 
 
2.2   Intensive and extensive margins: Prima-facie evidence 
Figure  1  shows  the  evolution  of  simple  averages  over  all  products  of  our  two 
concentration  indices  (Herfindahl  and  Theil)  expressed  as  indices  relative  to  the 
sample‘s initial year. That is, for Herfindahl, Figure 1 shows    7 




t kt t k H H m
   is  the  simple  average , for  year t, of the Herfindahl indices 
calculated for all mt goods k imported by OECD countries at t. The calculation is the 
same for the Theil index. 
 
Panel a) shows concentration indices calculated using all OECD imports (i.e. imports 
from  all  partners,  including  intra-OECD  ones).  A  strong  diversification  trend  is 
shown by both indices until 1999 (Herfindahl ) and 2002 (Theil), after which both 
rise until 2006, the sample‘s last year (by 8.6% for Herfindahl and 1.5% for Theil). 
Panel b) shows concentration indices calculated using only extra-OECD partners (i.e. 
developing  countries).  Both  Herfindahl  and  Theil  indices  decrease  until  1990 
(modestly for Theil, which goes down by about 10% over the period) and then go up. 
Between  1999  and  2006,  the  Theil  index  rises  by  7.4%,  almost  three  times  its 
coefficient of variation over the period 1963-99.  
 
The trend reversal is unmistakable as far as imports from non-OECD countries are 
concerned. However, it takes place quite late in the sample period. In order to verify 
whether  it  is  statistically  significant,  and  that  it  is  not  a  pure  composition  effect 
between products (i.e. a sectoral shift away from widely-procured products toward 
narrowly-procured  ones),  we  now  turn  to  regressions  of  concentration  indices  on 
time  and  its  square  using  fixed  (product)  effects.  Results  are  shown  in  Table  2. 
Columns  (1)-(2)  show  results  with  concentration  indices  (the  dependent  variable) 
calculated over all imports (including intra-OECD) whereas columns (3)-(4) show 
results  for  extra-OECD  imports  only  (a  more  interesting  measure  from  a 
developmental perspective). The within estimator confirms the convex time trend, as 
both time and its square are significant with opposite signs.    8 
 
  Figure 1   
OECD import concentration, 1963-2006 



































































































Note: base 100, 1963; simple averages of indices over all products. Data from COMTRADE 
 
As  for  the  extensive  margin,  Figure  2  shows  the  evolution  of  simple  and  import-
weighted averages, across SITC4 lines, of the number of exporters to the OECD over 
the sample period. 
  Table 2   
Regression results, OECD import concentration on time trend 
All imports Extra-OECD imports only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regressors: Herfindahl Theil Herfindahl Theil
time -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.023***
(-13.19) (-34.03) (-31.80) (-43.53)
timesq 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(1.616) (4.723) (23.17) (28.13)
Constant 0.218*** 2.913*** 0.425*** 3.330***
(202.6) (861.4) (221.1) (686.9)
Observations 54030 54030 53769 53769
Number of index 1301 1301 1301 1301
R-squared 0.571 0.671 0.510 0.570
turning point 2001 2001 1993 1997
Product FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
The extensive margin as measured by the average number of source countries does 
not  seem  to  show  the  same  kind  of  trend  reversal  that  we  observed  in  the 
concentration  indices,  which  pick  up  action  at  both  the  extensive  and  intensive   9 
margins.  Simple  averages  of  the  average  number  of  OECD  suppliers  by  SITC4 
product category are rising monotonically over time.4 
 
  Figure 2   
Average number of exporters to OECD, 1963-2006 
Extra-OECD suppliers only5 





























































a/ Simple averages of number of exporters to OECD at the product (SITC4) level. 
b/ Import-weighted averages (weights = shares of each SITC4 product in OECD imports in given year) 
 
Import-weighted averages are leveling out after 2000, but this is not very surprising. 
The numbers on the vertical axis show that on a trade-weighted basis, the average 
number of suppliers per product was over 100. For many products, this is likely to 
exhaust the pool of potential exporters, so a leveling off is to be expected. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of pooled and fixed-effects regressions of the number of 
exporters to the OECD on time, its square, and a specific time trend for the post-
2000 period.  
 
In  the  latter  period,  as  expected  from  Figure  2,  there  is  a  decline  in  the  rate  of 
increase in the number of exporters to the OECD.  This is reflected by the negative 
coefficient on Post 2000.  This inflexion is however not strong enough to reverse the 
                                                   
4 Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2010) provide evidence of this increased number of exporters serving the 
OECD market. Focusing on French firms, they found that the number of imported inputs varieties 
from developing countries increase in average by 48% over the 1995-2005 period.  
5 Figures including all  suppliers are very similar to the one presented here and are available upon 
request.    10 
trend.  The  observed  re-concentration  of  OECD  imports  thus  seems  to  be  entirely 
caused by action at the intensive margin. 
 
 
  Table 3   
Regression results, Number of countries exporting to OECD 
Time 0.662 0.593 0.583 0.543
(17.18)*** (12.71)*** (38.49)*** (29.66)***
Time, squared 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009
(9.19)*** (8.52)*** (24.76)*** (20.79)***
Post 2000 -0.391 -0.228
(2.63)*** (3.91)***
Constant 15.103 15.481 16.560 16.777
(40.80)*** (38.99)*** (113.19)*** (107.19)***
Observations 53'770 53'770 53'770 53'770
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.54 0.55
Number of SITC4 1'301 1'301
Fixed (prod.) effects no no yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: Dependent variable: Number of non-OECD exporters to OECD. 
The time variable is an index starting as 1963 = 1. The post-2000 variable is another index starting at 
2000 = 1. The panel is unbalanced. 
 
 
In order to explore further what might be driving the apparent re-concentration of 
OECD  imports,  we  now  decompose  OECD  imports  by  importing  country  and 
construct  a  three-dimensional  panel  whose  unit  of  observation  (the  basis  for  the 
calculation of our concentration indices) is a product imported by an OECD country 
in a year (a triplet importer  product  year). Looking at things this way allows us to 
look for another type of composition effects that would work as follows. Suppose that 
the OECD has two members, A and B, with B sourcing its imports of a given product 
more narrowly than A. A rise in B‘s share of OECD imports will raise the OECD-wide 
import  concentration  index  for  that  product  through  a  pure  composition  effect, 
although  in  our  previous  regressions  this  would  be  a  within-product  rise  in  the 
concentration index. Regression results are shown in Table 4.  
 
Several observations come out of Table 4. First, the re-concentration apparent in the 
Herfindahl  and  Theil  indices  seems  robust  to  the  introduction  of  fixed  effects  by 
importer  product pair. The news comes from the extensive margin, where not only 
the square term on time preserves the mononicity of diversification but even the post-
2000  time  trend  no  longer  indicates  a  trend  inflexion  in  the  very  last  years.  The   11 
disappearance of the trend inflexion (apparent in Table 3 which included fixed effects 
by products but not by importing country because the unit of observation was all-
OECD  imports)  suggests  that  the  inflexion  resulted  from  a  composition  effect 
between importers as described above. 
 
To sum up, the observed re-concentration of Table 2 is robust to the decomposition of 
OECD imports by importing country. However, as Tables 3 and 4 show, it does not 
occur at the extensive margin, all of the action being at the intensive margin. 
 
  Table 4   
Regression results, OECD import concentration on time trend 
 
Herfindahl 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007
(115.74)*** (86.33)*** (140.45)***(92.51)***
Time, squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(51.13)*** (27.11)*** (41.94)*** (3.42)***
Post 2000 0.005 0.008
(14.76)*** (39.35)***
Constant 0.807 0.802 0.798 0.789
(932.13)*** (859.28)***(1320.17)*** (1216.18)***
Observations 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13
Fixed effects a/ no no yes yes
 
Theil 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time -0.012 -0.009 -0.019 -0.015
(63.78)*** (41.27)*** (155.47)*** (100.10)***
Time, squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(7.94)*** (7.32)*** (35.37)*** (7.05)***
Post 2000 0.012 0.020
(19.11)*** (47.64)***
Constant 4.236 4.222 4.358 4.336
(2336.35)*** (2160.58)*** (3626.10)*** (3363.56)***
Observations 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.18
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Number of partners 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time 0.093 0.153 0.062 0.091
(31.30)*** (42.34)*** (40.07)*** (48.33)***
Time, squared 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003
(46.90)*** (14.21)*** (129.70)*** (75.63)***
Post 2000 0.305 0.147
(29.10)*** (27.01)***
Constant 3.259 2.917 3.033 2.871
(111.72)*** (92.81)*** (196.73)*** (173.47)***
Observations 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420 1'154'420
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.29
Fixed effects a/ no no yes yes  
  Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
                          a/ fixed effects by importer  product pair 
2.3   The China effect 
Considering the rising importance of OECD trade with China over the last decade, we 
must control for the role that China may play in that re-concentration. Figure 3 shows 
the  evolution  of  the  Theil  index  for  extra-OECD  imports,  both  with  and  without 
China.  The figures show that China is indeed driving the observed re-concentration. 
Further evidence is provided in Table 5, which shows that the coefficient on time 
squared loses its significance when China is excluded from the sample.  
 
Figure 3 
Theil index for OECD imports excluding China, 1963-2006 
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Figure 4 confirms that the increased concentration of OECD imports on China occurs 
at the intensive margin: In recent years, no new product line opened between China 
and its OECD trade partners.  
 
Table 5 










Product FE yes yes




Contribution of the intensive and extensive margin to  













extensive margin intensive margin
 
 
Thus,  although  their  imports  are  increasingly  concentrating  on  Chinese  products, 
OECD countries continue to open new imports lines with extra-OECD countries. That 
is, China‘s expanding exports to the OECD do not seem (yet) to crowd out the entry of 
new exporter/product pairs on OECD markets.   
   14 
To sum up, the evidence in this section shows diversification taking place over time, 
subject to one caveat: China‘s growing share of OECD imports, which caused a recent 
re-concentration at the intensive margin. However, the evidence so far does not say 
what drives this progressive diversification, nor what counter-forces, if any, may be at 
play, preventing it from being instantaneous. That is, prima-facie evidence does not 
tell us when the doors of OECD markets open and when they close. We posit that 
OECD buyers, in search for quality, test suppliers and concentrate on the best.  As the 
set of suppliers expands and buyers continue sampling, diversification takes place.  In 
order to explore this conjecture, we first build up a very simple, stripped-down model 
of  quality  search.  We  then  introduce  additional  assumptions  on  buyer  tastes  and 
expanding  supplier  pool  potentially  interfering  with  the  basic  quality-search 
mechanism. Finally, we explore empirically the model‘s testable implications. 
 
3.  A simple model of quality search 
3.1 Baseline model 
In this section we explore how supplier concentration is affected by informational 
considerations in the presence of a selection problem. Consider a three-period setting 
where, in each period, a buyer needs to procure two units of a product from either 
one or two suppliers called X and Y. Each supplier has the capacity to provide either 
one or two units, as the buyer wishes, at a constant price. Suppliers are of unknown 
quality, with a per-period probability of providing a non-defective product equal to 
G    for  a  good  type  and 
BG     for  a  bad  type  (that  is,  the  arrival  of  defective 
products  follows  an  independent  Bernoulli  process  for  each  supplier).  The  buyer 
knows 
G   and 
B   but not the type of each supplier, and assigns a prior probability  1 p  
on a good type in the initial period. Let 
1   be the buyer‘s profit on a non-defective 
product and 
01   on a defective one, payoffs being additive, and let  1
i    designate 
the event that the product is non-defective. Let  
 
   
10 1
G G G                       (4)   15 
be the expected profit from buying from a good type and similarly for 
B  . In periods 
2 and 3, the buyer revises his beliefs about the quality of each supplier on the basis of 
information (defective product or not) he obtained by dealing with them (if he did) in 




















           (5) 
be the revised probability that supplier i is a good type in t, based on information 
from period t-1. 
 
The  buyer  faces  two  sequential-sampling  (or  stopping-time)  problems  on  two 
independent  stochastic  processes,  but  the  decisions  are  not  independent  because 
sampling on one has consequences for the optimal stopping time on the other. The 
problem is thus potentially very complicated, but the limitation to two suppliers and 
three periods keeps it tractable.6 Consider the third-period problem, and let  3 V be the 
buyer‘s expected profit. Suppose that he dealt with both suppliers in period 2. Then in 
period 3 he buys both units from the best, so  
 
        
**
3 3 3 2 2 1 2
GB V p p                 (6) 
where 
   
*
3 3 3 max ,
xy p p p   
is the highest of the two posteriors. If he used just one of them in period 2, i, then he 
just keeps that one and 
 
         3 3 3 1 2 1 2
i G i B V p p                 (7) 
                                                   
6 The problem of selecting the stochastic process that delivers the highest expected reward among a set 
of  independent  processes  is  known  in  the  statistical-decision  literature  as  a  ―multi-armed  bandit‖ 
problem. One strategy, called ―epsilon-first‖, consists of a sampling (exploratory) phase during which 
several ―levers‖ are tried, after which the experimenter sticks to the lever for which he has the most 
optimistic belief based on information gathered during the sampling phase.   16 
where 
i p3 is the revised belief on supplier i used in period 2. Clearly, by definition of 
the max,      33 21 VV   and the difference,      3 3 3 21 V E V E V           , is the value of 
information generated by keeping both suppliers in period 2. 
 
In period 2, with two suppliers and a discount factor  , 
 
 
       
       
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2 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 .
x y G x y B
x y y x G B
V p p p p
p p p p V

  
   
       
      (8) 
With one supplier, 
 
          
**
2 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1
GB V p p V                  (9) 
where   
*
2 2 2 max ,
xy p p p  .  
 
In  period  1,  finally,  the  prior  being  the  same  on  both  suppliers,  both  are  used, 
generating the information used to revise beliefs from  1 p  to  2
x p  and  2
y p  respectively.   
Clearly, the ―interim‖ payoff collected in period 2 is higher, in expected value, with 
one supplier than with two, since in the former case the buyer buys only from the best 
whereas in the latter he carries both along. However, the expected period-3 payoff is, 
as noted, higher when two suppliers are kept in period 2 because the information 
generated has a value. Thus, there is a trade off between concentrating on the most 
efficient supplier and keeping several in order to ―test‖ them.  
 
What does the value of the information depend on? Suppose that, at the end of period 
1, the buyer kept only one supplier, the one with the highest probability of being 
good, and suppose (without loss of generality) that it was supplier x. Letting  2 I  stand 
for the information available at the beginning of period 2, the conditional expectation 
of the period-3 gain is (see appendix): 
 
      3 2 2 2 21
x G x B E V I p p       .            (10)   17 
Let    3 3 2 2 Pr
y y x y x p p p p      be the probability that y would perform better than x in 
period 3, given that he performed worse so far, if we could observe both in action in 
period 3. Using this, it can be shown that the value of the information is 
 
 
   
   
3 3 3 2 3 2




y y y x x G B
E V p p I E V I
E p p p p

  
     
     
         (11) 
Thus, the value of the information depends on three multiplicative terms. The first is 
the  probability  that  a  good  draw  for  the  second-best  supplier  would  reverse  the 
ranking  of  beliefs.  In  a  three-period  model,  sampling  stops  in  period  one  and 
concentration has to take place.7 By contrast, with more periods a reversal of beliefs is 
possible, and so, depending on the parameters (   and   )  continued  sampling  is 
optimal.  In  section  3.1.2  below,  a  multi-period  simulation  of  the  model  provides 
evidence of this phenomenon.  
 
The second term is that in square brackets. Observe that it is decreasing in 2
x p ; the 
better is the ―front-runner‖ supplier (x) the less there is to gain from an eventual 
reversal of beliefs. In our 3-period setting, this doesn‘t say  much, but in a multi-
period setting it would have a potentially important consequence on which we will 
return.  
 
The third term, finally, is the difference in expected gains between a good and a bad 
supplier, which can be written as 
                                                   
7 In our three-period model, the event that  22
yx pp   implies that y had a defect in period 1 while x did 
not. Then, if fortunes are reversed in period 2 (x has a defect while y has not), it is easily verified that 
posteriors at the beginning of period 3 will be just equal for x and y. So, at best, the buyer will be 
indifferent between x and y in period 3.  In(11), we have thus  0
y    and, given the multiplicative 
form of  , the value of the information is nil: There is no reason to keep on sampling after period  1. 
In a 4-period framework, at the cost of tedious algebra it is (relatively) straightforward to show that a 
reversal of beliefs is possible with two successive lucky draws on y and two unlucky ones on x, and so, 
continued sampling (using both suppliers) can be optimal in period 2. 
   18 
 
    
10 G B G B           .            (12) 
The first factor on the RHS of (13) is the difference between the prospects of a good 
and  a  bad  supplier,  a  measure  of  their  heterogeneity;  the  second  is  the  effect  of 
quality  differences  on  profit,  a  measure  of  the  industry‘s  characteristics  (quality-
sensitivity). Thus, the value of information, which in our setting drives the search for 
quality, is increasing in their heterogeneity and in the sensitivity of buyers to product 
quality. 
3.2 More than three periods 
With more periods, the revision of beliefs (i.e. the difference between posterior and 
prior from one period to the next) becomes smaller over time as beliefs approach 
asymptotically zero or one, but how fast the process of revision converges depends, of 
course, on the parameters of the two processes. If the two distributions (good and 
bad) have similar parameters, it takes, in expectation, more time to tell apart the two 
types,  which  requires  longer  sampling.  Figure  5  illustrates  how  the  rate  of 
convergence varies with the parameters. In the LHS panel the two distributions are 
characterized  by  sharply  different  parameters  and  beliefs  converge  after  twenty 
periods; in the RHS panel, the two distributions have similar parameters and the 
beliefs take almost a hundred periods to converge.  
 
Figure 5. 
Random draws of Bernoulli processes in two cases 
A pair of draws with  0.8, 0.3
GB     A pair of draws with 0.6, 0.4






























Notes: The dotted blue curve gives 
x
t p , the revised probability that x is of the good type; the long-
dashed red curve gives same thing for y, and the plain black curve gives the difference between the   19 
two. The same parameters are used to draw the observations and to update the beliefs (parameters are 
assumed common knowledge); x is of the good type and y of the bad type. 
 
In the LHS case, positions tend to lock in fairly quickly. In the RHS case, longer 
sampling is needed to tell apart the two suppliers; however, note that the difference 
in expected returns (
GB   ), which is part of the value of the information, is also 
smaller, so the truth takes longer to appear but it matters less. Observe also that in 
the RHS panel, around iteration #20, supplier x has accumulated so many bad draws 
and supplier y so many good draws that the buyer is ―almost certain‖ that y is of the 
good type, even though this belief is false (observe the dotted curve (y) approaching 
one between iterations #20 and #40). Going back to (11), we see that 
 
    0 lim lim 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 2     
 
x x y y
p p p p p p E x x ;        (13) 
that is, when the buyer becomes ―almost certain‖ that his currently preferred supplier 
is of the good type, the value of information goes to zero and he stops sampling. If 
that were the case in the RHS panel of Figure 5 (where the preferred supplier around 
iteration  20  is  y)  the  part  of the  red,  long-dashed  curve  lying  to  the  right  of  the 
stopping time would be censored. The remaining incumbent (here y) would then be 
the sole supplier until sufficient evidence accumulates to convince the buyer that he 
had bet on the wrong horse (in the figure, that becomes clear after about iteration 60 
and  the  posterior  on  y  finally  converges  to  zero  around  iteration  90).  The  buyer 
would  turn  to  the  alternative  supplier  only  when  his  revised  opinion  on  the 
incumbent drops back below the evicted supplier‘s last posterior.8 
 
The  model  thus  implies  that  concentration,  when  it  occurs,  is  on  high  quality 
products.  It also suggests that periods of diversification are followed by periods of re-
                                                   
8  Note  that  in  this  setup  there  can  be  no  ―informational  cascade‖.  An  informational  cascade 
(Bikhshandani et al. 1992) can take place when a sequence of actors make binary decisions on a singe 
issue (say, buying or selling a stock) based on a noisy signal about the correct decision and on the 
observed behaviour of past players. Each player forms his own belief based on a weighted average of 
his signal and past players‘ actions, with weight on the latter that increases with the number of past 
players. Bikhshandani et al. show that there exists a critical number n such that, if n players observe 
the wrong signal and act accordingly, the n+1st will discard his own signal and follow the crowd. From 
then on, the herd behaviour cannot be reversed. Our setup is different because the buyer is repeatedly 
getting  information  about  his  supplier,  whereas  in  an  informational  cascade  the  individual 
experimenter gets only one signal that he compares with the actions of other (past) players.  
   20 
concentration—that  is,  diversification  occurs  by  ―bouts‖.  This  simple  model  is 
however not sufficient to generate the diversification process observed in Section 2. 
In order to shed light on the forces at works, we add to the model two additional 
assumptions: (i) buyers have a taste for diversity, and (ii) the number of suppliers is 
expanding.  
 
4. Quality search with diversification 
4.1 Taste for diversity 
A taste for diversity can be introduced in the model by replacing the assumption of 
additive payoffs by a utility function of the form 
   
1/
i i
                      (14) 
where   
01 , i      is the profit made on the purchase from supplier i. To see what 
happens to the model‘s basic predictions, consider period 3. The reasoning is similar 
for earlier periods. The period-3 payoff from using one supplier only (the preferred 
one), which was previously given by (6), is unchanged. That is, 
 
     
**
3 3 3 2,1 2 2 1
GB V p p     .            (15) 
The corresponding payoff if the buyer uses both suppliers in period 3 is 
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      (16) 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the preferred supplier is x. Replacing 
*
3 p  by 
3
x p  in (6), it is easily verified that, for  1   , keeping one supplier is optimal (this is 
the benchmark case without a taste for diversity). However, as  goes down, the sign 
of the inequality is eventually reversed and the taste for diversity comes to dominate 
the selection effect. This is illustrated in Figure 6 where    3 2,1 V and    3 2,2 V are shown 
as functions of    1/ 1   , the elasticity of substitution between the two suppliers,   21 
for  assumed  parameter  values.  For  values  of     below  4.3,  the  taste  for  diversity 
dominates and keeping both suppliers is optimal; for values above 4.3, the selection 
effect dominates and keeping only one supplier is optimal. 
 
 
 Figure 6 
Period-3 profit from one vs. two suppliers, as a function  












Notes: Simulated parameter values are π1=100, π0=50, 
                                     λG=0.8, λB=0.1, p3x=0.8, p3y=0.1. 
 
What does this mean for our model? Essentially that the taste for diversity acts as a 
counterforce to the selection effect, generating situations where the Bayesian update 
of beliefs designates one supplier as preferable to others but the buyer nevertheless 
keeps several because he values diversity.  
4.2 Entry of new suppliers  
The  number  of  suppliers  would  enlarge  if  trade  costs  were  coming  down  or  if 
productivity was rising exogenously among producers in a pool of potential suppliers 
with heterogeneous productivity levels as in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). 
Several empirical studies evidence this increase in the number of potential suppliers. 
Cadot  et  al.  (2011)  show  that,  over  1989-2005,  on  average  each  country  has 
introduced  50  to  200  new  export  products.  Similarly,  using  a  more  restrictive 
definition  of  new  products,  Klinger  and  Lederman  (2004)  found  that  1710  new 
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Indonesia).9  Suppliers  would  then  appear  progressively,  creating  scope  for 
diversification of supplier sources at the extensive margin. As before, the repetition of 
transactions with incumbents would asymptotically reveal their quality, but strings of 
bad draws would always be possible even for good types, and their replacement 
would then set the clock back to zero for the new ones. With several entrants all 
characterized by similar priors, buyers would start by sampling all of them like at the 
beginning of our 3-period model, subsequently concentrating on the best. Episodes of 
diversification would be followed by episodes of concentration.  
 
Thus, informational considerations in the multi-period setup suggest that, in sectors 
where quality matters and is not standard across suppliers, entrants will find it hard 
to unseat incumbents as long as those perform well. But, with stochastic quality 
draws, incumbents are bound to fail one day or another. When they fail sufficiently 
severely (i.e. with a string of bad draws in a row), a window of opportunity opens up 
for entrants, ushering in a new phase of diversification, quality search, and ultimate 
re-concentration on the best performers. 10 With an increasing number of suppliers, 
the number of best performers chosen as importers increase over time.  The buyers‘ 
taste  for  diversity  reinforces  this  effect.  There  is  diversification.  What  the  model 
shows is that diversification will happen by ―bouts‖, as a result of repeated failures in 
established buyer-supplier relationships, rather than as a continuous phenomenon.  
 
All in all, our simple model suggests essentially this: 
 
1.  Diversification  of  import  sources  can  be  driven  by  two  forces:  (a)  quality 
search  in  the  presence  of  a  selection  problem;  (b)  an  exogenous  taste  for 
diversity. 
 
                                                   
9 Note that these studies consider new products at the HS6 level. The number of new producers is 
obviously much larger.  
10 Failure may also be triggered endogenously by moral hazard if incumbents slacken the monitoring 
effort as time passes. For a reputational model with both selection and moral hazard, see e.g. Laeven 
and Perotti (2001).    23 
2.  When  driven  by  quality  search,  diversification  is  only  a  temporary 
phenomenon, as the buyer will, at the end of each search phase, re-concentrate 
on the best supplier. 
 
3.  Incumbent  suppliers‘  established  positions  will  periodically  be  unseated  by 
strings of bad quality draws, which will trigger the onset of new search phases. 
 
4.  With an increasing number of suppliers, new search phases are likely to entail 
higher diversification over time. 
 
Thus, whereas the taste-for-diversity forces generate maximum diversification at all 
times (an essentially static prediction), quality search suggests alternating phases of 
diversification and re-concentration. The existence of these phases is implied only by 
the informational features of the model. Thus, volatility in concentration levels can be 
taken as a hallmark of informational phenomena and it depends on the heterogeneity 
of quality levels across suppliers.11 This implies two testable propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: When concentration occurs, it occurs on goods of higher quality. 
 
Proposition 2: Time-wise volatility in the concentration of imports is higher for 
goods that are more heterogeneous in terms of quality.   
 
We now turn to an empirical exploration of these conjectures.  
5. Concentration and quality search: Testing for 
“bouts” 
Proposition 1 involves unobservable quality heterogeneity. We approximate quality 
by  unit  values,  of  which  we  calculate  import-weighted  averages  for  each  OECD 
importer,  good  and  year.  If  re-concentration,  when  it  takes  place,  is  on  the  best 
performers, we expect positive year-on-year changes in the Theil index to correlate 
                                                   
11 However, supply shocks knocking out suppliers periodically could also create exogenous volatility at 
the extensive margin. This is to be kept in mind in the empirical exploration that follows, as baseline 
volatility is unlikely to be exactly zero.   24 
with positive changes in the average unit value of imports. The average unit value‘s 
rise is a composition effect, as buyers concentrate on high-quality suppliers. Thus, a 
straightforward test would consist of regressing, on a panel of products or (importer 
× product)  pairs (recall that we are looking at concentration across source countries), 
first  differences  in  Theil  indices  on  first  differences  in  average  unit  values  across 





Regression results, change in Theil on change in unit values 
Dep. Var
Regressors
Δ UVik(t-(t-1)) / (Δ Theilik(t-(t-1))>0) 1.05E-06 ** 9.78E-07 * - -
Δ UVik(t-(t-1)) / (Δ Theilik(t-(t-1))<0) -3.47E-07 -2.04E-07 - -
Δ UVik(t-(t-1)) / (Δ Theilik(t-(t-1))>0.1) - - 1.45E-06 ** 1.43E-06 **
Δ UVik(t-(t-1)) / (Δ Theilik(t-(t-1))<0.1) - - -2.02E-07 -1.56E-07
Observations (ikt) 1,059,984 1,059,984 1,059,984 1,059,984
Nber of products (k) 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299
Nber of importers (i) 29 29 29 29
Years (t) 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006
Observations with Δ Theil>x  640,038 640,038 377,294 377,294
Importer × Product Fixed Effects Yes - Yes -
Importer Fixed Effects - Yes - Yes
Product fixed effects - Yes - Yes


















Notes:  estimation  with  OLS;  standard  errors  in  parentheses:  heteroskedasticity-consistent  and 
adjusted for product-level clustering; * : p=0.1, **: p=0.05, ***: p=0.01. 
 
The corollary is that the effect is asymmetric: whereas the model predicts that unit 
values should rise during concentration phases, it is silent on the evolution of unit 
values during diversification phases. At the beginning of a search (i.e. diversification) 
phase,  all  suppliers  are  tested  independently  of  their  initial  quality  draw.  This 
corollary can be used to sharpen our test of the model‘s base prediction. To do this, 
we replace first differences in unit values as a regressor by two interaction terms 
defining two distinct regimes. In regime 1 (concentration), first differences in unit 
values are interacted with a dummy equal to one if concentration is rising (ΔTkt > 0).   25 
In  regime  2  (diversification),  first  differences  in  unit  values  are  interacted  with  a 
dummy equal to one if concentration is rising (ΔTkt < 0).  Table 6 gives regression 
results for this test and a variant where the regimes are restricted to ΔTkt > 0.1 and 
ΔTkt < 0.1 respectively.   
 
The first two columns of Table 6 confirm the model‘s base prediction. Positive year-
on-year changes in the Theil index correlate with positive changes in unit values, and 
this result holds for a large set of fixed effects. That is, when there is re-concentration, 
it  takes  place  on  higher-quality  suppliers.  As  shown  in  columns  (3)  and  (4),  this 
positive impact becomes stronger when restricted to deeper re-concentration phases, 
i.e. for phases where first differences in Theil are over 0.1 (this threshold corresponds 
to  the  top  25%  of  the  re-concentration  phases  in  terms  of  ΔTkt).    Strikingly,  no 
significant correlation is found in diversification phases. We tested the robustness of 
this  result  by  running  the  same  estimation  using  the  numbers  of  partners  as  the 
dependent  variable.  Results  are  similar  to  those  presented  here  and  are  available 
upon request.  
 
Finally, a similar regression using import-weighted averages of the exporters‘ GDP 
per capita instead of unit values gives a qualitatively similar result, suggesting that 
when  re-concentration  takes  place,  it  is  on  suppliers  located  in  higher-income 
countries, which tend to produce higher-quality goods (on this, see Hallak and Schott 
2008). The evidence in Table 6 is thus suggestive of a quality-search process rather 
than a price-search one (in a price-search model, the search phase would settle on the 
lowest-price supplier).  
 
We  now  turn  to  Proposition  2,  which  says  that  the  alternating  phases  of  quality 
screening and re-concentration will be more pronounced for products whose quality 
matters  and  where  it  is  not  standardized  across  suppliers.  That  is,  the  time-wise 
volatility  of  concentration  should  correlate  with  the  dispersion  of  quality  across 
suppliers.  In  order  to  test  for  this,  we  measure  the  time-wise  volatility  of 
concentration at the (importer × product) level by the normalized standard deviation 
of the Theil index over the entire sample period. We approximate the dispersion of 
quality  across  suppliers,  also  at  the  (importer  ×  product)  level,  by  the  standard   26 
deviation of unit values across time and exporters. Note that, in so doing, we reduce 
the sample‘s dimensionality from three (importer  product  time) to two (importer 
 product), i.e. we collapse our panel into a cross-section of (importer × product) 
pairs. 
 
Before we turn to regression results, let us take a look at the relationship between the 
time-wise  volatility  of  concentration  and  the  variability  of  unit  values  for  OECD 
imports  as  a  whole  (i.e.  disregarding  heterogeneity  between  importing  countries). 
The plain line in Figure 7 is generated by regressing standard deviations of Theil 
indices on standard deviations of unit-values using pooled OLS with White-corrected 
standard errors.12 The broken curve in the same figure is generated by running  a 
―smoother‖ (non-parametric) regression instead of OLS. Non-parametric regression 
imposes no functional form and is therefore well suited to the exploration of data 
with  no  pre-determined  relationship  between  variables.13  Both  show  a  positive 
relationship between the volatility of concentration  over time (the amplitude of the 
alternating diversification/re-concentration phases) and the variability of unit values 
across time and suppliers (the extent of the selection problem). 
  Figure 7   
Volatility of the Theil index versus volatility of import unit-value 
 
                                                   
12 95% confidence interval is also reported. 
13 Non-parametric "smoother" regression consists on re-estimating regression for overlapping samples 
centered on each observation.   27 
 
We  now turn  to  a  parametric  test  exploiting  cross-importer  variation  in  our  base 
relationship  (although  the  time  dimension  of  the  panel  is  still  collapsed  by  the 
construction of our volatility variables). In Table 7, the normalized standard errors of 
Theil and unit values are computed using both the whole sample (column 1) and the 
sub-sample of  (importer × product) pairs with at least 30 non-missing observations 
over  1963-2006  (column  2).  Results  presented  in  Table  7  confirm  the  positive 
correlation  between  volatility  in  concentration  indices  and  variability  in  product 
quality.  As  shown  in  columns  3  and  4,  our  results  are  also  robust  to  the  use  of 
standard deviations in the numbers of partners as the dependent variable instead of 
standard deviations in Theil indices. 
 
Table 7 
Regression results, volatility of concentration on product quality heterogeneity 
Dep. Var
Regressors
 σ_UVik 1.63E-03 *** 1.02E-03 *** 1.75E-02 *** 1.01E-02 ***
Observations (ik) 36,209 26,820 36,209 26,820
Nber of products (k) 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299
Nber of importers (i) 29 29 29 29
Period 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006 1963-2006
Importer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
(3) (4) (1) (2)
 σ_Nberik  σ_Nberik  σ_Theilik  σ_Theilik
(1.10E-03) (1.02E-03) (2.28E-04) (2.27E-04)
 
Notes:  estimation  with  OLS;  standard  errors  in  parentheses:  heteroscedasticity  consistent  and 
adjusted for product-level clustering; * : p=0.1, **: p=0.05, ***: p=0.01. 
 
Thus by and large, results are as suggested by the model. Re-concentration phases 
occur on goods of better quality and the volatility of concentration indices is higher 
for products with high quality heterogeneity. This indeed suggests alternating periods 
of diversification and concentration in search for quality. 
 
6.   Concluding remarks 
Looking at the evolution of OECD imports at a high degree of disaggregation (over 
1,000  product  lines)  0ver  the  40-year  period  where  data  are  available,  we  find 
striking evidence of geographical diversification at the product level. That is, OECD   28 
countries have been sourcing each of their imported products from increasingly large 
pools  of  suppliers.  We  also  find  evidence  of  a  geographical  re-concentration  of 
imports in the last five years or so, but this trend reversal is entirely attributable to 
the growing share of China in OECD imports. Put together with Besedes and Prusa‘s 
(2006a, 2006b) findings of high churning rates among exporters, our results suggest 
that  OECD  markets  seem  to  be  increasingly  contestable  for  developing-country 
exporters, at least at the source-country level if not at the firm level.  
 
As  for  the  drivers  of  diversification  vs.  re-concentration,  we  find  that  when 
geographical  concentration  takes  place,  it  tends  to  be  on  higher-priced  national 
varieties. It is also more volatile for those goods which may be highly differentiated 
quality-wise  where  quality  presumably  matters  more  and  is  more  heterogeneous 
across suppliers. Put together, these observations lend support to a model of quality 
search  by  OECD  buyers  generating  alternating  periods  of  concentration  and 
diversification,  discussed  in  section  2  of  this  paper.  Our  quality-search  approach 
suggests that the contestability of OECD markets varies across time and products, 
with  periods  of  closed  doors,  characterized  by  strong  incumbency  advantages, 
alternating with periods of open door, characterized by contestability. In terms of 
policy implications, our results highlight the importance of raising exporter quality-
management capacities in developing countries, as periods of open door appear to be 
essentially periods of quality search.   29 
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Appendix 
The expression for the expected period-3 gain, as of the beginning of period 2, given 
that the buyer kept only one supplier, x, is  
 
          3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 0
x x x x E V I q E V q E V              (17) 
where the probability of no defect in period 2 given information at the beginning of 
period 2,  2
x q , is 
     
B x G x x x p p I q    2 2 2 2 2 1 1 Pr      ,          (18) 
and the expected gain in period 3 is 
           3 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2
x x x G x x B E V p p                    (19) 
given no defect in period 2 and  
           3 2 3 2 3 2 0 0 2 1 0 2
x x x G x x B E V p p                  (20) 
given a defect in period 2. Finally, the probability of supplier x being of the good type 
is, by Bayes‘ rule, 
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
        (21) 
given no defect in period 2 and  
       

















   
   
    (22) 
given  a  defect.  Substituting  these  expressions  into  (17)  and  simplifying  gives 
expression (10) in the text. 
 
 